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Abstract Transit operations control, the task of implementing the operations plan
in daily operations on a metro line, plays a key role in service delivery because it
determines the quality of the service experienced by passengers. Yet, it is one of
the most poorly understood aspects of rail transit operations. Faced with a disrup-
tion or infeasibility, dispatchers typically choose between several response strategies.
However, to date, it has been very difficult to evaluate the positive and negative ef-
fects of individual control strategies with respect to operations and passenger travel
times under real-world conditions. This paper proposes a framework for the study of
rail operations control decisions that integrates automatically collected service and
passenger demand data, which are increasingly available and accessible to transit
agencies. The framework supports a multiperspective analysis methodology that can
inform operational policies and plans, and help operations control decision-makers
choose the most appropriate strategies to manage service. By using automatically
collected data, taking into consideration the operations control decision environment,
and acknowledging that the reliability of the resulting service depends on many fac-
tors endogenous to it, this paper takes a distinctly different approach from previous
studies, which have relied heavily on modeling, assumed simple operating contexts,
and did not consider the full range of available data. Two real-world applications of
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the framework, where control decisions are evaluated in terms of their operational
and passenger impacts, are presented. The methodology is found to be versatile and
valuable in providing insights that could not have been gained otherwise. Although
the framework is applied to the London Underground, its logic, structure, and proce-
dures are applicable and transferable to other metro systems recognizing that certain
specifics would need to be tailored to the available data.
Keywords Rail transit · Operations control · Disruption recovery · Transit
reliability · Automatic data collection systems · Total passenger travel time
1 Introduction and motivation
On any rail transit line, the basis for the service provided to customers is the ser-
vice plan, which defines routes, service frequencies, and the span of service. The
service plan provides the input to the development of the operations plan, which de-
scribes the manner in which the agency’s resources—rolling stock, personnel and
infrastructure—are to be utilized in order to fulfill the service plan. The operations
plan generally consists of a working timetable (including scheduled non-revenue train
movements), a crew schedule, a vehicle assignment and a crew roster collectively rep-
resenting a plan aimed at achieving the best possible level of service for passengers
subject to constraints on agency resources.
The implementation of the operations plan in everyday operations is the task of
the transit agency’s operations controllers and involves all front-line staff (e.g., train
operators and station supervisors) as well as vehicle and infrastructure maintenance
divisions, engineers and operational support personnel. It is often impossible to op-
erate the service exactly according to the operations plan due to unforeseen events
(e.g., disruptions), infeasibilities (e.g., arising from high demand leading to conges-
tion), and unavailability of resources (e.g., absent crew and unavailable equipment).
An important part of the operations controllers’ tasks is to modify the operations
plan, including the train schedule reflected in the timetable, in real-time to account
for such situations. This process is commonly referred to as operations control, or
synonymously as service control or operations management. Therefore, operations
control is the central, real-time control of scheduled operations that directly results
in the daily operations provided to passengers. Its centralized nature, in which con-
trollers are provided with information on the state of the entire system, sets it apart
from local dispatching techniques, where a supervisor is positioned at a terminal or a
station along the line to monitor local conditions and issue local instructions.
Operations control directly governs the interaction between the supply of trans-
portation capacity and the demand for it on a daily basis. The activities of the opera-
tions control center of a metro line or network capture the integration of the network’s
central communication, decision-making, and coordination functions. The operations
control process, as described in Froloff et al. (1989), consists of a transit line (or
network) in a state of optimal operations at the beginning of the service. Due to
disruptions or delays, it then deteriorates to a disrupted state. If nothing were done,
operations would further deteriorate. To prevent this deterioration and to restore good
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operations, operations controllers take corrective actions, known as “interventions”,
toward a target state. Example interventions include holding of trains in stations, can-
celing individual train runs, diverting trains or unplanned crew changes. Further train
and crew related interventions are discussed in Sect. 2 and definitions including de-
tailed descriptions are provided in Carrel (2009). These interventions extend over
time and the system only gradually moves toward its target state. During this process,
further unforeseen events may occur, prompting controllers to intervene again. This
process is continuous over time, taking place from the beginning of the service day
until the end. The set of interventions taken to restore service generally follows a
control strategy, which is either explicitly defined by agency policies or is based on
the operations controllers’ experience, knowledge of the system, and rules of thumb.
During the evolution of this process, operations controllers work with three
streams of input. First, controllers receive realtime information on the current operat-
ing state of the line (or network) including the positions of trains from the operations
control system (OCS). Depending on the design of the OCS, additional information
may include the scheduled train run a train is covering, the train’s destination, the
train’s lateness with respect to the schedule, the train’s loading, and the driver’s ID.
Secondly, a controller has information on the target state of the system. With the
exception of operations under severely disrupted conditions, the target state is com-
monly the state the operations plan aims to achieve at a given time-of-day. Thirdly,
operations controllers are in communication with drivers, rolling stock and crew man-
agers, and other field personnel and could receive field information directly from
them.
While operations planners of a metro line provide essential inputs to operations
controllers, in turn they need to have a good understanding of the operations on
the line in order to be able to make informed decisions on service policies, vali-
date assumptions made during the operations planning process, and identify possible
changes to the operations plan that could have a positive effect on the functioning
of the line. Moreover, as Rahbee (2001) points out, operations control techniques
are often passed down by word-of-mouth to new controllers; therefore, a good un-
derstanding of operations is essential for improving and formalizing operations con-
troller training. However, operations control remains heavily reliant on human judg-
ment and often informal and seldom documented practices mostly driven by anecdo-
tal evidence without data to back them up. Feedback from passengers is sometimes
consulted. In addition, mathematical models have played some role, albeit limited, in
supporting the development of such an understanding.
In recent years the availability of train and passenger data from automated data
collection systems has markedly increased, making a wealth of information on the
functioning of a transit line available. Such data could support empirical evidence-
driven modifications or improvements to the understanding of the complexities of
line operations. In this paper a framework is proposed to empirically evaluate line
operations based on such data for the purpose of either identifying limitations and
suggesting alternative approaches or validating the effectiveness of certain operations
control strategies.
Section 2 of this paper summarizes pertinent literature and discusses the focus
and value of the study with respect to the literature. The proposed framework and
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the description of its elements are presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 presents two real-
world applications of the framework. The final section provides a summary and a
concluding discussion.
2 Literature and focus of study
There is a wide range of literature on operations control, much of which is concerned
with developing optimal control strategies. This paper does not focus on prescribing
or improving specific control strategies, but rather seeks to provide practitioners and
researchers alike with a framework and corresponding tools that enable the evaluation
of field implemented strategies. This study focuses specifically on operations control
interventions that utilize the resources (equipment, crew, and infrastructure) of the
metro line under consideration and that are therefore under the control of the respec-
tive operations control center. The literature presented in this section concentrates on
studies that investigate these types of interventions. Of course, future research on the
proposed framework could be extended to include control strategies that make use of
complimentary systems such as buses to bridge inoperable metro line segments, as
presented, for example, in Kepaptsoglou and Karlaftis (2009) and Jin et al. (2013).
Although research on operations control strategies and dispatching dates back to
at least the early seventies, studies on operations control considering all the inter-
ventions operations controllers have at their disposal and commonly resort to are
limited. Example train related interventions include changing of schedule, holding,
early dispatching, short-turning, withdrawing, diverting, extending, changing track
assignments, expressing, and adding service. Example crew related interventions in-
clude substituting drivers, dropping back and jumping up in case of breaks during
layovers, and switching drivers. As mentioned above, Carrel (2009) provides defi-
nitions including detailed descriptions of train and crew related interventions. The
exact set of interventions available to an operations controller at a given time and
location is a function of the layout of the network, the nature of the particular service
disruption, the design of the signaling and train control systems, and the availabil-
ity of spare rolling stock and crew. Furthermore, depending on the degree of system
automation, the operations controller may implement changes remotely through the
signaling system, the automated train control system, or by directly communicating
with train drivers. Many previous research efforts dealt with simple line layouts and a
restricted set of control interventions. This limitation may not be surprising given the
complexity of the problem and the large variety of service patterns and intervention
strategies that a controller typically has to consider. Moreover, many studies where
mathematical formulations intended to produce optimal control strategies on a transit
route or line are developed focus on passenger in-vehicle travel time or waiting time
and headway regularity, which may limit their adoption in real-world situations.
Much of the early research involving mathematical formulations assumed that the
dispatcher had little or no real-time information on the position of vehicles along
the line. Those studies generally examine local dispatching or holding strategies at
predetermined control points on the line (e.g., terminals or time points), taking as
input the timetable and possibly the distance between a vehicle and its immediate
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neighboring vehicles, but no real-time information on the state of the line as a whole.
The most notable examples of such studies are those by Osuna and Newell (1972),
Koffman (1978), and Abkowitz (1986).
The emergence of real-time sensing systems providing data from all vehicles serv-
ing a transit line has enabled recent research to take a broader approach to the holding
and dispatching problem and to consider, in addition to holding, other types of oper-
ations control interventions such as short-turning, expressing, and deadheading. This
development creates a strong tendency to use optimization models, calibrated with
archived vehicle location data, that seek to find optimal control strategies under dis-
rupted conditions. However, these studies do not simultaneously consider the wide
range of interventions and the complexity of the decision environment operations
controllers work within.
A series of related studies of this type are those of Eberlein (1995), Eberlein et al.
(2001), O’Dell (1997), Shen (2000), and Puong (2001). Eberlein (1995) and Eberlein
et al. (2001) considered the holding problem in the presence of real-time position data
on multiple trains on a route. O’Dell (1997) considered holding and short-turning
as feasible strategies for responding to a disruption in real-time. Shen (2000) ex-
tended O’Dell’s formulation to include expressing. Puong (2001) built on the studies
of O’Dell and Shen, to account for terminal capacity constraints. The objectives re-
flected in the formulations developed in these studies are to minimize in-vehicle or
on-platform delays to passengers assuming centralized operations control. Moreover,
in all cases the demand and interstation train travel times are assumed deterministic
and known and the duration of the disruption is assumed known. Other example stud-
ies include those of Adamski and Turnau (1998) and Walker et al. (2005). Adamski
and Turnau (1998) focused on dispatching while Walker et al. (2005) introduced a
formulation capturing the simultaneous recovery of a train timetable and of the crew
roster after a single disruption on a simple rail line, but without considering passenger
delays. More recently, Daganzo (2009) and Daganzo and Pilachowski (2011) devel-
oped vehicle holding and speed control strategies, respectively, based on real-time
headway information taking into account uncertain demand and vehicle travel times.
Regarding the evaluation of developed strategies, Eberlein (1995), Eberlein et al.
(2001), O’Dell (1997), Shen (2000) and Puong (2001) compared the performance of
the strategies produced by their formulations with a do-nothing scenario to demon-
strate the effectiveness of their proposed strategies. However, it is unrealistic to as-
sume that operations controllers would always “do nothing” (unless there is a good
reason to do so). While the passenger travel time savings with regard to a do-nothing
scenario may be useful for comparison across formulations, the important question is
whether any of the formulations are able to provide an improvement over operations
control on the line as it exists in practice. Answering this question obviously requires
an analysis of operational and demand data and a reconstruction of the service on a
daily basis as a benchmark for performance evaluation. Daganzo (2009) and Daganzo
and Pilachowski (2011) analyzed the performance of the resulting control strategies
from a reliability perspective, both analytically and numerically. However, as in the
other studies referred to above, they did not consider in-service data collected on an
operational system.
With the increasing availability of automatically collected operations data, several
recent studies focused on the role and use of such data for both operations recon-
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struction and analysis purposes. For example, Wile (2003), Dixon (2006), and Ji et al.
(2010) specifically focused on the use of automatically collected data for the analy-
sis of operations and presented examples based on data collected off an operational
system. Wile (2003) explores how transit agencies can use automatically collected
operational data for a variety of applications—including operations control, passen-
ger information and safety—and establishes a range of agency functional needs that
can benefit from such data. However, the study does not offer an integrated method-
ology for operational analysis taking advantage of multiple sources of operations and
demand data. Dixon (2006) presents a tool to automatically reconstruct daily opera-
tions on heavy rail lines of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA)
from data produced by the OCS. This tool inspired the more detailed and compre-
hensive reconstruction methodology developed as part of the framework described in
this paper, however, it is limited in scope in that it does not identify operations control
interventions and link the reconstructed operations to those decisions. Ji et al. (2010)
evaluated the effects of holding and stop-to-stop travel time adjustments on service
reliability using a large data set of automatically collected vehicle trajectories on an
operational bus route. However, while expected passenger demand patterns are con-
sidered in interpreting the results, demand data were not used in the study. In addition
to the above studies, the use of operational data is relied upon in a broader framework
developed by Rahbee (2001), focused on the analysis of operational problems on rail
transit lines.
While the studies by Rahbee (2001), Wile (2003), Dixon (2006) and Ji et al. (2010)
present insightful and valuable findings in specific areas of operations reconstruc-
tion and analysis using automatically collected data, none of these studies considers
the full range of data currently available to transit agencies. Furthermore, although
several of these studies mention the potential uses of aggregate demand data from
Automatic Passenger Counter (APC) systems, these authors did not systematically
incorporate the analysis of passenger movement data in their operational analyses.
Doing so is particularly feasible in the presence of disaggregate passenger flow data
(e.g., from Automated Fare Collection (AFC) smartcard data) that allow inferences
on the time a passenger spent inside the system. These data can be used to estimate
demand at a fine level of granularity and infer individual passengers’ experiences
from the time the service is accessed to the time the traveler leaves the system. Thus,
the aforementioned authors do not emphasize the opportunities and challenges re-
lated to the integration of highly detailed data from multiple sources relating to both
operations and demand for operational analysis.
Finally regarding the literature, Froloff et al. (1989) identify and systematically
categorize objectives, constraints and techniques for bus operations control aimed at
the design of a simulation system for controller training. Despite the focus on bus
services, many of the topics addressed form a good foundation for studying opera-
tions control on rail systems in that the study reflects the only attempt to describe
the decision environment of operations controllers, i.e., the complete description of
variables, objectives and constraints that affect operations controller decisions, thus
setting this study apart from virtually all other research on operations control strate-
gies. However, for research to be applicable in a real-world context, it should not
only recognize the multi-faceted decision environment of the operations controller
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but also specifically recognize the interactions that exist and the possible conflicts
that can arise among them. This issue is treated extensively by Carrel (2009) and
Carrel et al. (2010), where a detailed description of the rail service controllers’ de-
cision environment is provided and the interactions between different objectives and
constraints are illustrated. To the extent that they are pertinent in the context of this
paper, the findings are summarized in Sect. 3.3.
This study is therefore motivated by the need for a comprehensive framework and
accompanying methodologies to analyze operations control questions, especially one
that takes into account both the multiplicity of operations control interventions that
could be applied in an operational setting and the increasing availability of train and
passenger movement data. The key insight is that any effort to analyze and build
a good understanding of operations on a line must include operations control, and
therefore, the proposed framework would have to allow for considering the full range
of interventions available to controllers. In this paper, it is argued that virtually any
transit agency with centralized operations control would stand to benefit from taking
this perspective. The framework incorporates multiple dimensions relating to opera-
tions control, namely control, operations, and demand. This is made possible by the
multiple sources of both operations and demand data that are considered and inte-
grated in a consistent manner. Notable regarding the capture of passenger experience
is the consideration of the observed total travel time from the moment passengers
enter stations to the moment they leave. This is in contrast to the optimization formu-
lations discussed above, in which one or more journey components (typically waiting
time or in-vehicle time) were analytically derived.
Another key distinguishing aspect of this study is the application of the proposed
framework and accompanying methodologies using data from the London Under-
ground to analyze specific service disruption cases. In doing so, the feasibility of the
framework is demonstrated and its value is shown regarding both identifying opera-
tions control limitations in one case and validating the effectiveness of an operations
control strategy in another. More specifically, the framework has improved the abil-
ity of London Underground analysts and engineers to infer, analyze, and evaluate the
impact of interventions on the operational level of service and on passengers. Further-
more, it is hoped that it will eventually aid the training of operations controllers in
implementable and effective control methods that are not only focused on operational
level of service metrics but also on passenger experiences. Although the framework is
applied to the London Underground’s Central line, and as such some of its specifics
are tailored to the nature of the available data on this line, the logic, structure, and
procedures of the framework are applicable and transferable to other metro systems
recognizing that certain specifics would need to be tailored to the available data. It
is imperative to emphasize though that while the framework—once tailored—can be
applied in a large range of unique situations, improved or new operations control
strategies aimed at remedying problems identified through the proposed evaluation
framework will need to be prescribed through subsequent processes and analyses
carried out under the auspices of the operating agency. That is, the development of
such strategies is beyond the scope of this study.
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3 Developed framework
In this section the developed framework and its elements are presented and discussed.
Since the two applications of this framework presented in Sect. 4 relate to the Central
Line, this line is referred to at appropriate points in this section as well to provide
a realistic context to the concepts and methods behind the various elements of the
developed framework.
3.1 Overall structure
Before the emergence of automated vehicle and passenger data collection systems,
the rail transit sector was by no means a data-rich environment, prompting operations
planners and analysts to rely on models for understanding operations and the effect
of potential changes. However, recently, the availability, accessibility and quality of
operational and passenger data have greatly improved; where possible, the analysis
of these data can often provide a considerable amount of information and answers to
planning questions and can serve as a sound basis for the development of predictive
models. Moreover, the limitations of previous research studies on operations con-
trol motivate the need for an approach that integrates multiple perspectives and data
sources in order to gain a better understanding of operations control (and therefore of
operations).
To achieve this integration, the following elements need to be considered: oper-
ations control decisions (i.e., interventions), the reasons for which the decisions are
made, the operational level of service on the affected line segments, and passenger
travel times. These elements and their relationships are shown in Fig. 1. Collectively,
these elements represent the overall structure of the framework. Furthermore, the two
types of factors that lead to operations control intervention decisions are also shown,
namely disruptions and general operating and demand conditions. If data on these
factors are available, they can be included in the analysis.
The interventions represent deviations from the operations plan, and measuring
the resulting operational level of service allows analysts to quantify the impact of
those strategies on the service. However, this is only an intermediate step since ul-
timately the concern should be with the impact on passengers. Once the operational
level of service has been quantified, the link can be made to passenger travel times
by making certain assumptions and applying models linking operating conditions to
passenger experiences. However, in the presence of automatically collected passen-
ger data, especially data that allow inferences on the total travel times of passengers
between their entry into and their exit from the system, it is now also possible to
directly infer the impact of operations control strategies on passengers, as shown in
Fig. 1 with a dashed arrow. This direct linkage is one distinguishing aspect of the
developed framework, and in the applications presented in Sect. 4 is seen to be of
great importance in service evaluations carried out using London Underground data.
Understanding the reasons for the decisions requires a more qualitative approach.
As previously mentioned, the decision to perform an operations control intervention
is informed by the controllers’ knowledge of operating and demand conditions as well
as disruptions to the service. It is important to note that a disruption is not a direct
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Fig. 1 A framework for studying operations control on a metro line
cause for an intervention, but is rather the root cause of a deviation of the service
from the intended service or the cause of a conflict between trains. In either case,
the disruption in turn leads a controller to decide whether and how to intervene to
restore service quality or to address the conflict. In this sense, since a controller may
determine that a small disruption does not warrant an intervention, the decision not to
make any changes in the face of a disruption is also a possible outcome of operations
control.
This framework focuses on the reasons for intervention decisions, the identifica-
tion of operations control interventions, and the assessment of their impact. Disrup-
tions and the characterization of operating and demand conditions are only consid-
ered as necessary to understand the root causes for intervention. In the remainder
of this section the individual elements of the framework are discussed in more detail,
and in Sect. 4 two applications are presented showing how the elements are integrated
to support the analysis of reconstructed operations control strategies and their impact
on operational service and passenger experience.
3.2 Reconstruction of operations and diagnosis of operations control interventions
The first step in the analysis of an operational question is the reconstruction of op-
erations within the time frame of interest and the identification of operations control
interventions. In Fig. 1, this element is indicated with [1]. Since the availability and
quality of OCS data can vary between lines and across systems, it is not possible to
establish a unique methodology for all types of OCS data. A high level of detail is not
essential for this task, although the more detailed and the higher quality the data, the
easier it is to deliver an in-depth and precise description of what occurred on a line.
While the reconstruction methodology presented in this paper is specific to the con-
text of and the level of detail of the data available for the London Underground line
applications presented in Sect. 4 (these data are typically only available from modern
OCS), the underlying concepts are transferable and the methodology can serve as a
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guideline for other metro systems that could be adapted to varying contexts and levels
of detail in the available data.
The basic information required as input to the reconstruction methodology is the
following:
• Actual times at which a train passed either all stations or a set of predefined points
along the line. These locations can be time-points, critical locations such as junc-
tions and reversing facilities or the line terminals.
• Scheduled trajectories train units are operating on, typically in the form of numbers
that link the train units to the vehicle blocks they are assigned to.
• Numbers that clearly identify physical train units. Ideally, these would be car num-
bers if the OCS records them. If trains are assigned to vehicle blocks and retain
their block number throughout the day, then these numbers can be used as identi-
fiers. If, however, controllers can reassign trains to different vehicle blocks during
service or if trains are withdrawn to depots between the AM and the PM peak and
there is no continuity in the block numbers assigned to them, then car numbers are
essential.
This information allows the reconstruction of train movements throughout a day
at a basic level, for example with a space-time plot. It also allows one to make the
link between planned operations and the service that was actually operated by com-
paring the operations plan with the recorded train movements. The next step is the
identification of operations control interventions.
Preferably, there should be a direct way of matching the scheduled with the op-
erated service, as shown in the hypothetical example in Table 1. To facilitate the
understanding of Table 1, the station names and associated routings refer to the Lon-
don Underground Central line, the line this methodology is applied to in Sect. 4 (a
line diagram is shown in Fig. 2). The availability of such matches depends on the
features of the OCS, and the case where they are not readily available is outside the
scope of this paper—see Ji et al. (2009) for a discussion and a possible solution to
this matching problem in this case. Each row of Table 1 shows one observed train
run, i.e., the movement of a train between two reversals. It features information on
the origin and the destination of the train and on the observed departure and arrival
times. The right-hand side of Table 1 shows the timetable run that was covered by
this train and the scheduled origin, destination, departure and arrival time according
to the operations plan.
Any change to a train trajectory is necessarily the decision of an operations con-
troller, and by identifying discrepancies between scheduled and operated services,
the analyst can infer and identify the actions of operations control. Even though this
table takes into account only the limited amount of information outlined above, it
allows the identification of short-turns, diversions, extensions, cancellations and un-
scheduled trips. Schedule adherence at terminal departures and arrivals can also be
inferred through the comparison of the “observed” and “scheduled” parts of Table 1,
and under certain conditions (depending on the information reported by the OCS)
one can identify when a controller decided to dispatch a train early.
With more detailed information from the OCS, a table of this type can be expanded
to include intermediate stations, the vehicle block number a train was assigned to at
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every station, platform numbers, and crew information, leading to a nearly complete
reconstruction of the trajectories of each train. This additional information allows
the identification of other operations control interventions, namely expressing trains,
withdrawals en route, changes in platform and track assignments, the reassignment
of trains to different vehicle blocks and unscheduled crew changes (e.g., the use of
spare drivers).
If the quality of the OCS data is sufficient, both the reconstruction of operations
and the detection of operations control interventions can be automated, as described
by Carrel (2009). Such automation has several advantages over relying on manual
logs completed by operations controllers. The latter will generally be filled out only
when controllers have time. During the most stressful moments in control centers, e.g.
during major disruptions, controllers are likely to be consumed by their operations
management tasks, to the detriment of the reliability of the manual logs. Aside from
that, controllers may record poor operations management decisions incompletely or
not at all.
3.3 The operations controllers’ decision environment
The next step to understanding and evaluating operations on a line, indicated with
[2] in Fig. 1 and an important element of the framework, is to identify the reasons
for which operations controllers performed the observed interventions. This step is
rather unstructured in that it relies on available manual logs and conversations with
controllers and other front-line staff. As is shown in Fig. 1, any decision made by
controllers needs to be put in the context of the operating and demand conditions
and disruptions that led up to it. The availability of such information varies between
agencies, but is often available in the form of manual disruption logs, weather logs,
and AFC data.
Given the complex interactions among the set of objectives, constraints, and provi-
sions by the operations plan that a controller has to consider when making a decision,
a recognition and understanding of these factors and their interactions are necessary
to understand operations control interventions. Carrel (2009) and Carrel et al. (2010)
present a comprehensive approach to acquiring this knowledge where decision fac-
tors and constraints in operations control were observed during extended visits to a
control center of the London Underground and the overall decision environment is
described as completely as possible. In the remainder of this section, only the aspects
pertinent to the subsequent discussion and applications presented in this paper are
briefly pointed out.
Probably the most important driver of operations control is the adherence to the
operations plan. A significant deviation from the train timetable or the crew schedule
can trigger an operations control intervention. Adherence to the train timetable is a
well-known factor, but the major importance of crew management has seldom been
sufficiently recognized in previous studies. It is one of the most complex aspects
of operations control, as it is generally governed by numerous rules and regulations
that pose constraints on the possible recovery strategies that controllers can follow
under disrupted conditions. Adherence to the operations plan is very important for
the efficient management of assets (e.g., trains, infrastructure capacity, and staff), and
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the presence of multiple criteria regarding, for instance, levels of service and crew
management, can lead to conflicts. In the absence of an official agency policy that
states priorities and gives general guidelines, controllers are likely to define their own
understanding of what constitutes “good” service in terms of schedule adherence,
headway regularity, or traffic patterns, but not always taking into account the impact
of those assumptions on passengers.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that uncertainty is omnipresent in opera-
tions control, as controllers are working with a stochastic system where it is difficult
if not impossible to predict precisely how the system will evolve, and decisions often
have to be made under time pressure. Control center observations revealed that when
choosing between recovery strategies, controllers would often favor those where the
outcome was subject to the least uncertainty. Another decision factor encountered in
the application presented subsequently in this paper is passenger safety. For instance,
trains stuck behind a blockage should be held in stations whenever possible since
that simplifies the evacuation of the trains in case the duration of the blockage turns
out to be long. Overall, control center observations indicated that in dealing with the
highest-priority objectives and constraints, operations controllers could sometimes
actually cause gaps in the service and delays that would likely require remedies at a
later stage. An example of such a situation is discussed in Sect. 4.
3.4 Measures of impact
Following the identification of operations control interventions and the reasons for
which they were performed, measures are needed to describe the impact of these in-
terventions on the operational level of service and passengers. Common performance
metrics for transit lines often take an aggregate spatial and temporal view of oper-
ations, for example by tracking performance indicators for an entire line over time
periods ranging from one day to several months. In contrast, the impact of operations
control interventions is typically limited to specific segments of the line and to small
time windows. In choosing between impact measures, the analyst should be aware of
the resolution trade-off in effect. A highly disaggregate representation would support
a high-quality analysis of intervention strategies but renders the analysis of operations
control over longer periods of time challenging due to the associated high degree of
variability from situation to situation. A more aggregate representation, on the other
hand, supports a long-term assessment but may hide the effects of operations control
interventions. Finding the appropriate balance for the situation at hand is critical and
yet is for the most part context specific and, therefore, needs to be addressed in light
of the situation at hand. Furthermore, the framework is flexible and can accommo-
date both simple and complex line layouts. The limiting factor for its application to
more complex situations is mostly the analyst’s ability to unambiguously attribute the
observed service patterns to the delay and the interventions being investigated.
The two steps of quantifying the impact of operations control decisions (as well
as the potential disruptions leading up to them) on operations and on passengers are
indicated with [3] and [4] in Fig. 1, respectively. Step [3] takes as input the exact
time windows and line segments that are of interest, as identified in the previous
steps. Step [4] relies on the same information as well as any insights into the spatial
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Table 2 Example intervention matrix with effects on line segments (one per direction)
and temporal extent of the operational effects that can be derived from step [3]. In
applying the framework to a specific metro network or line, the analyst would choose
the metrics most suitable for that situation. In the following subsections, the metrics
that were found to be most suited for the applications of Sect. 4 are presented and
discussed.
3.4.1 Operational level of service by line segment
All interventions that cause a train to be rerouted or canceled can be characterized
in terms of their impact on individual segments of the line. For example, a canceled
or short-turned train trip results in all of the line segments that train was scheduled
on to be served by one less train. On the other hand, an extension of a trip or an
unscheduled trip results in a train added to the service on some segments of the line.
A train diversion has both types of impact on different line segments. While the ad-
dition or removal of train service at individual stations would be the most precise
way of examining the impacts, the data become more manageable without much loss
of information if they are aggregated at a segment level. The segments should be
defined such that the scheduled level of service is approximately constant through-
out the segment and such that within the segment there are preferably few, if any,
reversing tracks that are commonly used by operations controllers.
Table 2 shows an example of how operations control interventions and the effects
on different segments of the line can be represented in the form of a matrix. The
top part of the table shows the number of interventions by types for each hour of
the day, and in the lower part, which is separated by segment, the net effects of the
interventions are shown either as added service on that segment (e.g., “1” indicates
that one additional train traveled over that segment) or a reduction in service (e.g., a
“−1”).
The lower part of the table shows the net effects of operations control interven-
tions in units of added (or reduced) number of trains traveling over a segment. These
are translated to the ratio of scheduled to operated service kilometers at an hourly and
segment level (i.e., measured in units of train-km/h for each segment), as is shown
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Table 3 Example matrix of train-km operated (in bold) and % of scheduled train kilometers (in italics)
by line segment and time period
Time period Section number
1 2 3 4 5
10:00–11:00 Westbound 33.0 141.2 330.0 235.7 53.2
111 % 98 % 100 % 94 % 95 %
11:00–12:00 29.7 137.5 300.8 227.9 56.0
100 % 96 % 91 % 91 % 100 %
12:00–13:00 29.7 141.3 341.6 262.6 58.9
100 % 100 % 96 % 93 % 100 %
10:00–11:00 Eastbound 33.0 127.6 321.1 227.8 56.0
111 % 89 % 97 % 90 % 100 %
11:00–12:00 29.7 155.6 320.6 244.3 53.0
100 % 108 % 97 % 97 % 94 %
12:00–13:00 29.7 135.7 299.8 213.1 57.6
100 % 93 % 89 % 85 % 106 %
in Table 3. This measure allows for the over- and under-provision of service to be
pinpointed to individual segments of the line and time periods, thus capturing the net
effect of an intervention strategy. For instance, if one train is shortturned but the one
behind it is extended to cover its trip out to the branch terminal, this will show up
as better service than if the first train had been short-turned without extending the
following one. This distinction is important since only looking at the intervention
counts may convey the impression that larger absolute numbers of interventions al-
ways result in increased service curtailments. It is worthwhile noting that the adopted
service measure is train-km/h for each segment rather than the number of trains per
hour (tph)—or alternatively average headway—serving a line segment. The reason
for not adopting tph is because, while tph is a good measure for a specific point on
the line (typically a station), for a line segment, trains may only serve portions of that
segment within a given time window, and tph measures would need to be somehow
averaged over multiple stations where they are not necessarily equal. The train-km/h
for each segment measure avoids such averaging, can be readily calculated, and offers
a clear indication of the operational level of service over space and time.
3.4.2 Passenger impact
The increasing use of smartcard based AFC technology provides transit agencies with
easily usable information about passenger flows on their network. In cases where
passengers are required to tap their fare cards upon their entry to and exit from the
system, such as in the London Underground, AFC data allow the direct measurement
of passenger time spent in the system from station entry to station exit, including
access time to the platform, waiting time, in-train travel time, transfer time, egress
time from the platform and possibly time spent for other activities inside the system,
such as waiting for somebody. From the measurement of this total origin-destination
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(OD) travel time, it is possible to draw inferences about the impact of disruptions and
service changes on passengers. In systems where passengers are required to validate
their fare card only when entering the metro system, the alighting locations could be
inferred through various procedures (e.g. by considering transfers and the boarding
stop of the return trip), as discussed, for example, in Wang et al. (2011). Given the
boarding and alighting stops as well as the entry time, the alighting time and thus the
travel time can be inferred from vehicle data. Alternatively, in the cases where not
even “tap-on” AFC data are available, the analyst can make use of passenger flow
models as long as some information about OD flows is available (e.g., from onboard
surveys). In the following discussion, it is assumed that passenger data include the en-
try time and location (origin station), exit time and location (destination station), and
that a unique card number allows the entry and exit to be linked. Such data are typ-
ically available in transit agencies with distance-based fares, whereas agencies with
simpler fare structures may only require passengers to tap their card upon entering
the system.
Not all operations control interventions have the same impact on passengers,
and different passenger groups will experience the effects of an intervention differ-
ently. One challenging task in assessing passenger impact is the quantification of the
(dis-)benefits manifested after an intervention for the following two reasons. First,
in daily operations, dispatching decisions are made continuously. Some interventions
are performed in order to mitigate the negative impacts of earlier interventions, so
the impact of a single intervention can often not be assessed without considering the
overall strategy. Second, due to the stochastic nature of the environment in which
the service operates, the inherent variability of dwell times and running times and
unforeseen events (e.g., additional disruptions) could quickly obfuscate the effects of
an individual intervention. Therefore, in quantifying passenger impacts, the analysis
should be limited to passenger delays (or travel time improvements) that can be as
clearly attributed to an intervention as possible.
The impacts of operations control interventions on passengers include:
• Increased or decreased waiting time at the passenger trip origin.
• An additional train transfer and waiting time during the journey in the case of a
short-turn or diversion.
• Increased in-vehicle travel time experienced by passengers on board trains that are
held at stations, need to travel at reduced speed between stations or make in-tunnel
stops.
Although passenger impacts differ across the various components of the travel expe-
rience, identifying the impacts on specific components with AFC data is not feasible.
Therefore, this analysis is restricted to the study of a sample of passenger total travel
times from the time of entry at the origin station to the time of exit at the destination
station, aggregated over a certain time period and pertinent OD pairs. The resulting
travel time distribution captures all passenger trips that started within that time pe-
riod and are distributed over all trains that served the respective OD pair. For a more
in-depth discussion, see Uniman (2009) and Uniman et al. (2010).
In the specific case of a high-frequency metro line, the temporal aggregation of
passenger journeys captures passengers of multiple trains, but often only a few trains
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are affected by a delay. For instance, of 12 scheduled trains per hour one or two may
be short-turned. For the purpose of illustration only, if one assumes even demand,
only 1/12 to 1/6 of the passengers traveling to destinations beyond the short-turning
point would be affected, either because they had to alight and wait for a later train
or because they experienced a gap in service of one or two additional scheduled
headways. Although the average travel time during this time period is an impor-
tant measure, it is clear that the average is insufficient for capturing the effects of
small disruptions and operations control interventions, as it has a limited sensitivity
to the (often small) subset of passengers who experience worse service. However,
one should expect to see a change in the shape of the travel time distribution, as said
subset of passengers experiencing worse service is pushed to contribute to the right
side of the travel time distribution.
Before making the trip, a single passenger will not know whether her train is the
one which is going to be short-turned or otherwise delayed; i.e., her travel time might
fall anywhere within the travel time distribution. The wider the distribution, the more
unreliable the service is from the perspective of the passenger. This acknowledgement
calls for an additional measure (or measures) capturing the spread in the distribution
and, thus, the unreliability in travel time. The Reliability Buffer Time (RBT) is such
a measure. Various authors have discussed this type of measure, among them Furth
and Muller (2006), Chan (2007), Uniman (2009), and Uniman et al. (2010). Uniman
defines it as:
RBT = PN − PM (1)
where PN , PM = N th and M th percentiles of travel time, respectively. Uniman pro-
posed PM = 50th percentile (i.e., the median) as an indicator of the typical travel time
a frequent traveler on the system would anticipate. A passenger wishing to reach her
destination by a certain time with a probability N/100 must budget the travel time
given by the N th percentile of the cumulative travel time distribution. Thus, the RBT
is the additional time to be budgeted over and above the typical travel time by pas-
sengers who wish to arrive at their destination by a certain time with a degree of
confidence given by the probability measure N/100.
Building on this, the framework uses two measures to summarize the travel time
distribution and thus the impact of interventions on passenger travel times: the aver-
age travel time, T¯ , and the RBT, either for every OD pair or across several OD pairs.
Both the average travel time T¯ and the RBT can be expressed as totals denoted by
T¯total and RBT total , respectively across the traveling population of interest, which is
helpful in putting the numbers into context. These two measures are calculated as
follows:
T¯total =
∑
∀i
Vi · T¯i (2)
RBT total =
∑
∀i
Vi · RBT i (3)
where Vi = passenger volume for OD pair i, T¯i = average travel time for OD pair i,
and RBT i = RBT for OD pair i.
166 A. Carrel et al.
The calculation of total average travel time can be performed at a line segment and
time period level and represents the total time expected to be spent traveling by all
passengers traveling on any given OD pair without accounting for the unreliability
of the system. The total RBT is most meaningful when compared to the total average
travel time, as it represents the total time all passengers would need to budget in
addition to their typical travel time in order to arrive at their destination by their
desired arrival time with probability N/100.
The quality of the numerical determination of the travel time distribution depends
on the quality of the AFC data. While there is no reason to believe that the AFC time-
stamps are error prone, any action of a passenger which is not directly related to the
originally intended trip (e.g., taking the wrong train or spending additional time at a
station to make a phone call or meet someone) enters into the travel time distribution
despite its irrelevance to the quality of service. Those passengers are likely to be
reflected in the higher percentiles of the distribution, giving a false impression of
service unreliability. Unfortunately, there is currently no way of filtering out such
passengers, so the analyst depends on the assumption that either any inexplicable
passenger behavior results in travel times beyond the N th percentile or that this subset
of passengers is sufficiently small and does not severely affect the summary statistics.
Chan (2007) showed that the impact of such behavior on the spread of the distribution
is minimal up to a value of N = 99 (i.e., the 99th percentile of trips). However, in the
illustrative example discussed in the next section, the minimum sample size used
for analysis was 10 trips, so for several OD pairs, a choice of N = 99 would have
required interpolation to determine the 99th percentile travel time. To increase the
number of OD pairs in which the N th percentile corresponded to an observed travel
time, a value of N = 90 was adopted.
Finally, it is not straightforward to distinguish whether the delays reflected in a
travel time distribution are caused by disruptions or by operations control interven-
tions because gaps in the service can be the consequence of either of these two events.
One could argue that passengers may not even care about the reason behind the gap.
However, to the transit agency, the reason is of great interest. Addressing the prob-
lem of determining the reason behind a delay is highly specific to the context of the
situation under examination, as can be seen in the next section.
4 Example applications
In this section, two different applications of the framework are presented. They are in-
tended to illustrate how the various elements of the framework are integrated and how
the framework can be applied in a real-world setting as well as to exhibit the value
of analyzing operations control from multiple perspectives using data from multiple
sources. The applications focus on the Central line, one of the longest and most con-
gested lines of the London Underground network. A simplified line diagram is shown
in Fig. 2 indicating the stations referred to in the discussion of the applications (in
total the Central line serves 49 stations). Even though the Central line does not share
tracks with other lines, its layout includes three branches and a loop, and trains oper-
ating on the line are generally divided into groups serving different pairs of branches
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Fig. 2 Central line diagram
on either side of the trunk section, or the trunk section only. Thus, from the point of
view of an operations controller, it is very similar to a set of different lines that share
a common trunk section.
In the first application of the proposed framework, a potentially problematic dis-
ruption recovery strategy is identified and recommendations for improvement are
made. In the second application of the proposed framework, a strategy for dealing
with rolling stock shortages is validated and a few recommendations for schedul-
ing are made. Between the two applications, the value of the proposed framework
as both an evaluation and improvement identification tool and a validation tool is
clearly demonstrated. Two additional applications using this framework can be found
in Carrel (2009) and Carrel et al. (2010).
4.1 Analysis of a disruption management strategy
This example shows how a retrospective analysis of the way a disruption was man-
aged by operations controllers through the application of the proposed framework
can help identify problematic operations management techniques. The insights from
such an analysis can, for example, be used to establish guidelines on priorities to op-
erations controllers and to consequently improve operations controller training. They
can also be used to motivate the development of improved control strategies in light
of the developed in-depth understanding of the complex situations controllers have to
work within and the consequences of the actions they take.
The focus of this analysis is a disruption that occurred on the Central Line on
April 1, 2008. The disruption can be summarized as follows: At 08:29, eastbound
train #141 experienced an in-tunnel delay between Lancaster Gate and Marble Arch
station due to a track circuit failure. (A track circuit is used to communicate oper-
ational commands of the automated signaling system to the on-board computer of
the train unit. In the event of a track circuit failure, trains cannot operate normally
over the affected segment of the line.) The scheduled headway at the location and
time of the disruption was 120 seconds. However, due to train congestion, it was not
uncommon for individual headways to be observed at values as low as 90 seconds.
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The disruption was cleared at 08:35, and the affected train departed Marble Arch
station at 08:36. This is the only information given by the Underground’s incident
log, and to understand what took place in the wake of the incident and how the dis-
ruption and control actions taken affected passengers, the developed framework is
applied to draw together information from multiple sources and determine the result-
ing operational level of service and passenger experience metrics. First, the demand
and operating conditions are considered during the period of interest. Demand on the
London Underground has a large peak-to-base ratio, with demand peaking between
08:00 and 09:00 and between 16:00 and 17:00. Furthermore, April 1 being a regu-
lar weekday, demand is highest on the central London segment of the line, roughly
between Notting Hill Gate and Stratford. Hence, this incident occurred at one of the
most congested times and locations on the line.
The goal of the analysis is to determine the amount of passenger delay caused
by recovery actions and operations control interventions, and to separate those from
the initial delay caused by the disruption. The first step involves the identification of
the operations control interventions that occurred on the Central line eastbound at or
shortly after 08:29, the start time of the disruption. The result of the analysis based
on the methodology described in Sect. 3.2 is that operations controllers held all trains
upstream of the disruption between Lancaster Gate and White City in stations. White
City is an important crew relief location. To the east of White City, the Central line
runs below ground through central London, while to the west of White City, the line is
above ground. On April 1, no holding could be detected to the west of White City, as
trains continued passing those stations with average-length dwell times. Furthermore,
two cancellations of consecutive eastbound trains out of White City occurred, one
during the disruption, at 08:33, and one shortly after the disruption was cleared, at
08:36.
The next step focuses on the reasons for the interventions. First, the holding of
trains in stations in the tunnel segments is performed for safety reasons (to facilitate
train evacuation if found to be desirable or necessary). Second, based on the explana-
tions given by controllers and conversations with Transport for London engineers, the
strategy of canceling trains during disruptions is common. There are several specific
reasons for which these cancellations were likely made. One is to prevent a buildup of
congestion between White City and North Acton, which would have persisted even
after the disruption had cleared due to dwell times at White City. Another is to reduce
the pool of trains and drivers that would be delayed by the incident (thus improving
the manageability and reducing the workload of controllers). And, a third is to create
two “spare” trains at White City which could be used later for service restoration, for
example to fill the gap in front of the incident train (in the westbound service).
The two remaining elements of the framework to be discussed are the assessment
of the impacts of these decisions on the operational level of service and on passenger
travel times. According to the operational data, the result of the two train cancella-
tions was that there was a gap of 7:20 min (equivalent to 3.7 scheduled headways) in
the service after the disruption had cleared. Applying the operated train-kilometers to
scheduled train-kilometers ratio measure proposed in Sect. 3.4, only 81 % of sched-
uled service (measured in train-kilometers) was operated between 08:00 and 09:00
on the eastbound trunk segment of the line, between North Acton and Leytonstone.
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Since the Central line OCS continuously records train loading as a percentage of
crush load, ranging from 0 % to 100 %, it could be confirmed from the data that train
capacity did become a binding constraint. Specifically, train #56, the first train after
that gap, departed White City at crush load (i.e., 100 % loading) since it had absorbed
all passengers from the canceled trains, and it remained at crush load until Holborn,
at the eastern end of the central business district. The following train, #31, had also
reached crush load by Marble Arch and remained at that loading until Holborn. The
removal of two trains from service during the peak hour reduced throughput capacity
by approximately 2100 spaces in that short period of time, leaving very little addi-
tional capacity for downstream passengers. Presumably many passengers were un-
able to board the crush loaded trains, causing them to be left behind and experience
longer waiting times than could have been attributed to the gap alone.
To verify this finding and assess the passenger impact of the disruption and in-
tervention, individual passenger travel times from AFC data are analyzed following
the methodology described in Sect. 3.4. A high variability in travel times is observed
for different passengers who had entered the system shortly before the time when
the crush loaded trains passed their station, presumably reflecting the fact that only a
fraction of passengers at stations where the trains were at or near crush load were able
to board, while others had to wait for the arrival of less loaded trains. The specifics
of the corresponding analysis are presented below.
Only eastbound passengers on the trunk segment are considered as they were the
ones unambiguously identified as affected by the disruption and the following gap.
To distinguish between the impacts of the disruption itself and the intervention (can-
celing two trains), two time bands are defined for the analysis. Time band 1 includes
the 30 minutes before the end of the disruption, including the disruption itself, while
time band 2 captures the 30 minutes immediately after the disruption had cleared.
Both time bands are defined to relate to passengers depending on the stations where
they boarded. Passengers accessing the service at a station downstream of the disrup-
tion are attributed to the first group if they tapped in before the passage of train #141
(the originally disrupted train) at that station and to the second group if they entered
the station afterwards. However, for passengers accessing the service at a station up-
stream of the disruption, stationary time bands are considered whereby bands 1 and
2 are delineated by the time the disruption is cleared at 08:35. Stationary bands are
adopted for upstream stations because it is assumed that as soon as the disruption is
cleared, the queue behind the disrupted train started dissipating.
To get a sense of the magnitude of passenger travel time changes due to the dis-
ruption and intervention, passenger travel times were also sampled during the same
time periods on November 21, which had very good, generally undisrupted service
and therefore served as a benchmark. Although in many systems there may rarely
be large time windows or areas of the network that are completely undisrupted, to
evaluate the effects of a specific operations control strategy, the analyst only needs to
find a benchmark timeframe during which the line section(s) under consideration is
(are) generally undisrupted and free of the effects of previous delays on the line. By
comparing travel times on the disrupted and the benchmark day, conclusions could
be drawn about the passenger impact of the disruption and of the recovery strategy.
The travel time distributions were weighted using the same OD flow matrix for both
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Table 4 Comparison of passenger impact of the disruption in the morning of April 1, 2008 with November
21, 2008
Time band 1: Passenger travel times
observed before and during time of
disruption
Time band 2: Passenger travel times
observed during the recovery effort
1-Apr (disrupted) 21-Nov (benchmark) 1-Apr (disrupted) 21-Nov (benchmark)
Average travel
time per
passenger [min]
19.04 16.55 19.69 17.21
Average RBT per
passenger [min]
7.35 3.96 9.22 3.65
days to remove the effect of differences in the flow matrices between the two days.
The results for both time bands and both days are shown in Table 4. The comparisons
clearly show the impact of the disruption management strategy in comparison to the
delays caused by the disruption itself. Firstly, the average travel times per passenger
calculated based on the total average travel time of Eq. (2) (normalization by total
passenger volumes is applied to render the figures in Table 4 comparable) hardly dif-
fer between the two time bands, and both are higher than the corresponding bench-
mark values for November 21. As a matter of fact, passengers after the disruption
effectively experienced the same service degradation with respect to November 21 as
during the disruption, which is evident from the travel time differences per passenger.
Secondly, in terms of the unreliability of the service as measured by the RBT, time
band 1 showed a modest increase compared to November 21, amounting to slightly
more than 3 minutes per passenger. In other words, passengers during the disruption
experienced longer overall travel times than under normal peak-hour conditions, and
the service was somewhat less reliable than usual. However, the situation is more
severe after the disruption, where the average additional RBT amounted to slightly
more than 5.5 minutes per passenger or 32 % of the average travel time under gener-
ally undisrupted conditions as reflected in the benchmark.
Therefore, not only did the interventions cause an additional average travel time
of the same magnitude per passenger as the delays caused by the disruption itself,
but the service became considerably less reliable during the recovery than during the
disruption. This difference in impact on reliability is presumably due to the two gaps
left by the canceled trains as well as to passengers left behind by the crush-loaded
trains mentioned earlier, conditions precipitated by the interventions. This result is a
clear example of how intervention actions taken by operations controllers, however
well intended from their perspective, can lead to increased unreliability experienced
by passengers. Aside from the delays to eastbound passengers on the trunk segment
that are quantified in this analysis and reported in Table 4, there were additional
passenger delays not captured by this analysis that occurred later in the westbound
direction since the two canceled trains were missing for an entire round-trip, and
therefore, the quantified delays represent lower bounds. A more complete discussion
of the analysis, the results and questions that cannot be answered with the passenger
travel time data alone is presented by Carrel (2009). Lastly, it is worth mentioning
that the present analysis focused only on passenger travel times on the trunk segment
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of the line due to sample size limitations. However, the analysis could readily be
extended to include passengers traveling from locations on the branches, using the
same methodology as presented.
In summary, analyzing this disruption by applying the proposed framework and
the corresponding methods associated with each of its elements leads to meaningful
insights on operations control. In this particular case, two possible reasons that are
found for the controllers canceling the two trains are to manage crew lateness and to
avoid train congestion buildup. In the case of the former, it is questionable whether
controllers were following the optimal priorities, as the tradeoff between passenger
delays and driver delays appears to be strongly out of balance. In the case of the latter,
an alternate strategy of holding additional trains upstream of White City would have
resulted in lower passenger delays after the disruption. In either case, the disruption
management strategy that has been adopted by controllers based on experience and
rules of thumb does not appear to be in the best interest of passengers based on the
evaluation results derived from the application of the proposed methodology.
To remedy this situation, the transit agency needs to establish common policies
and standards which frame the overall priorities of operations control and avoid or
diminish negative impacts. However, operations control decisions are also influenced
by the design of the operations plan and by the data, information and tools that are
available to controllers through the OCS. In this specific case, the design of the OCS
makes it difficult for controllers to hold larger numbers of trains since every indi-
vidual hold must be entered manually in the system and trains cannot be held at
all stations. Thus, in a holistic approach for achieving sustained improvements, the
aforementioned policies and standards need to be accompanied by changes in vehicle
and crew scheduling at the operations planning level and, in the long run, in the OCS
design.
4.2 Analysis of a train cancellation policy
Due to various reasons (e.g., shorter than planned rolling stock inspection cycles),
the London Underground Central line often suffers from rolling stock shortages, in
which case operations controllers must choose which train trips to cancel. A common
strategy on the Central Line is to cancel trunk service train trips (referred to as “local
runs”), i.e., trains scheduled to run only on the sections between North Acton and
Leytonstone, serving central London but not the suburbs on the branch lines. Given
that the trunk section also experiences the highest passenger volumes, the question
was raised whether this policy causes noticeable delays to trunk passengers whereas
passengers from the outer branches experience less significant or no delays.
Once again, the first step involves the reconstruction of interventions of interest.
Intervention matrices like the ones shown in Table 2 were used to identify April 1,
2008 as a day on which a steady number of cancellations had been performed repeat-
edly on the trunk section over a period of three hours in the early afternoon when
the scheduled headway was 150 seconds. The next step involved conversations with
controllers who provided the reasoning behind the strategy of canceling trunk service
in the event of rolling stock shortages. The trunk sections have the highest scheduled
frequencies, so in absolute terms, the gaps caused by canceling trunk service trips
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were smallest. Furthermore, due to the shorter end-to-end cycle times when com-
pared to branch-service trips, it was easier to re-insert a train into operation once one
became available. With regard to the identified cancellations on April 1, 2008, the
disruption log and service kilometer plots were used to ensure that the cancellations
were in fact due to rolling stock shortages and that no other unobserved major delays
occurred during that time. That is, by the early afternoon, the operation had already
recovered from the early morning disruption and corresponding interventions of the
previous application discussed above.
In quantifying the impact of the cancellations as part of the remaining two ele-
ments of the framework following the methodology described in Sect. 3.4, the pri-
mary focus was on the trunk section level of service and the travel times of passengers
traveling between two stations on the trunk section. In total, there were 11 canceled
train trips over the course of the three-hour period on April 1, all of which had been
scheduled to serve only the trunk sections of the line and not the outer branches. Ser-
vice delivery on the trunk sections averaged 93.5 % per hour whereas service delivery
on the branch sections averaged 97.3 % per hour. As in the case of the previous appli-
cation, November 21, 2008 served as a benchmark, where very good service was ex-
perienced during the time window of interest—on the branch and trunk sections alike,
the average service delivery per hour was 100.7 %. The travel time distributions for
two types of passengers were compared between the two days: (a) passengers travel-
ing within the trunk and (b) passengers traveling from the trunk to the branches and
vice versa. In general, the interpeak passenger volumes on the trunk are markedly
higher than the branch volumes. As in the case of the previous application, the travel
time distributions were weighted using the same OD flow matrix for both days.
The results are shown in Table 5. It can be seen that the difference in average
travel time between the two days is minimal (in the order of less than 10 seconds
per passenger). This is not surprising, as the scheduled frequency on the trunk during
the interpeak is high (24 tph) and on average, there were two trains per hour missing.
The analysis of the travel time reliability showed only a slightly different picture. The
total RBT is between 10 % and 20 % of total travel time, and the differences between
November 21 and April 1 do not appear to be large. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
that the total RBT is larger on April 1 for the trips within the trunk, whereas it is
smaller for the trips between the trunk and the eastern and western branches. Assum-
ing a normal distribution of the RBTs, a standard t-test confirmed the hypothesis that
passengers on the trunk experienced less reliable service (at a significance level of
0.01) on April 1 while the experience of passengers traveling between the trunk and
the branches is not significantly different from that of November 21. Finally, examin-
ing the magnitudes of the differences shows that they are in the order of a few seconds
in all cases. Specifically, on April 1, the average RBT on the trunk was 17 seconds
larger than on November 21, putting it at 2:33 min. A more in-depth discussion can
be found in Carrel (2009).
These results show that, although this strategy does distribute the impacts of
rolling stock shortages unevenly and perhaps mostly penalizing the trunk section
with its heavy demand, its overall impact is small enough that one can argue that
this does not call for immediate attention. However, in the long run, one may think of
ways to better align operations control decisions with passenger demand patterns in
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Table 5 Comparison of passenger impact of the cancellations in the afternoon of April 1, 2008 with
November 21, 2008 (undisrupted benchmark)
Within trunk Between trunk and
western branches
Between trunk and
eastern branches
1-Apr 21-Nov 1-Apr 21-Nov 1-Apr 21-Nov
Average travel
time per
passenger [min]
13.73 13.71 26.66 26.59 21.75 21.85
Average RBT
over all OD pairs
[min]
2.54 2.27 3.92 4.14 3.86 4.13
the event of rolling stock shortages, for example by incorporating “discardable” trips
in the operations plan.
5 Summary and discussion
In this paper, a framework is proposed to empirically evaluate metro line operations
based on automatically collected data for the purpose of either identifying limita-
tions to certain operations control strategies and suggesting alternative approaches
or validating the effectiveness of such strategies. The development of the framework
was motivated by several circumstances. First, operations control research to date
has relied heavily on mathematical modeling and mostly focused on individual or
small groups of interventions applied to simplified systems. In contrast, current con-
trol systems mostly rely on controllers’ experience and judgment on the application
of a variety of interventions within a very complex decision environment. This dis-
connect has strongly limited not only researchers’ ability to conclusively determine
through empirical field experiments whether the proposed models are able to provide
tangible improvement when compared to the state of practice, but also the adoption
of these models in real-world systems. Second, within many transit agencies, there
is a need to improve the feedback loop from front-line personnel to planning and
management levels in order to assess the adequacy and feasibility of operations plans
and operations management policies as well as to validate assumptions and models
used in the planning process. Third, and probably most importantly, the availability
of train and passenger data from automated data collection systems has markedly in-
creased, making a wealth of information on the functioning of a transit line available.
Such data can support empirical evidence-driven modifications or improvements to
the understanding of the complexities of line operations.
Furthermore, in this paper, it is argued that any effort to analyze and build a good
understanding of operations on a line must not only include operations control, but
also consider the full decision environment of controllers and the range of interven-
tions at their disposal. The proposed framework accounts for this by incorporating
various perspectives relating to operations control and by integrating automatically
collected data from multiple sources, thus facilitating the analysis of operational
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questions in an operations control centric manner. Although the specific method-
ologies and measures associated with the proposed framework were developed for
application to the London Underground, and therefore are tailored to the type of in-
formation available from the respective OCS and operations control logs, the logic
behind the framework’s design, the structure of its components, and the procedures
for deriving its individual elements are applicable to other metro systems as well.
Thus, the specific implementation of the framework can be adapted to other systems
with their specific input characteristics by following the structure and principles pre-
sented in this paper. The presented methodology is primarily designed to make use of
fine-grained passenger movement data, including times and locations at which pas-
sengers entered and exited the system. However, in systems where such fine-grained
data are not available, the analyst may be able to infer or model travel times depend-
ing on the type of data or information available as discussed in Sect. 3.4.
To illustrate the use of the framework and demonstrate its value in arriving at clear
conclusions and insights regarding the actions and impacts of operations control, two
real-world applications are presented in this paper. It is worth emphasizing that the
insights gained are possible as a direct result of the integrated structure of the de-
veloped framework and the corresponding methodologies relating to train movement
reconstruction, inference regarding the reasons driving controllers’ actions, and es-
timation of operational level of service and passenger travel time metrics. A crucial
aspect of this framework is the ability to directly link the controllers’ actions with
passengers’ experiences in the form of both average conditions and the resulting un-
certainties. While the examination of operational level of service—the predominant
perspective typically considered in practice and in some literature—is valuable, this
study demonstrates that on its own, it is limited. Only when the passengers’ perspec-
tive is incorporated, it is possible to arrive at a rich understanding of the impacts of
disruptions and, more critically, the resulting controller’s actions on service as expe-
rienced by the passengers.
The results produced by following the multi-perspective approach incorporated in
the developed framework not only provide benefits for short-term operations plan-
ning, but can also be useful for long-term investment planning. For example, a de-
tailed analysis of the use of infrastructure elements (e.g., crossovers and reversing
tracks) or equipment and human resources (e.g., spare trains, drivers or mechan-
ics) that provide operational flexibility can show where infrastructure upgrades or
resource deployments would be most cost effective. In addition, an analysis of the dis-
ruption patterns on a line and of controllers’ responses to disruptions where no such
infrastructure is available can indicate where the construction of additional capac-
ity (e.g., reversing tracks) would have the largest impact on operations performance.
Furthermore, when upgrades are made to operations control systems, a careful as-
sessment of the needs of controllers and the conditions they face can provide valu-
able benefits during operations. Many of the systems are only customizable before
installation and are very difficult to upgrade or amend at a later stage.
In closing, while certain aspects of the implementation of the proposed methodol-
ogy require tailoring to the nature of the available data, the general manner in which
the logic and structure of the framework integrate multiple perspectives and multiple
sources of data to arrive at meaningful operational insights and conclusions holds
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great promise, particularly in light of the framework’s demonstrated value through
real-world applications. This should encourage the consideration and implementa-
tion of this framework in practice, especially given the increasing availability of the
automatically collected data it relies on.
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